THE HUMANISM OF
BENEDICT OF NURSIA
by Terrence Kardong OSB
Assumption Abbey, Richardton, ND
I. Introduction
To speak about Benedictine values for the twenty-first century implies that
one has some idea of what the coming century will be in particular need of.
As far as I can see, there will be an urgent need to defend and maintain human
nature against threats that undermine it. I think there will be an increasing
need to promote a healthy humanism in the face of dehumanization.
Immediately someone may want to argue that humanism is precisely what has been
dehumanizing us for several decades now. I would call that "secular humanism,"
the kind that denies all transcendent values. I certainly don't plan to defend
that stance in a paper like this. Neither do I want to set the human species
apart from the rest of the environment: we are all in this together.
One might also contend that the defense of humanity against dehumanization
has always been a struggle. Yes, but recent times have seen the Nazi holocaust,
the Soviet gulags and the Cambodian killing fields, violations against humanity
so enormous as to make one wonder if some people simply forget what it is to
be a human being at all. In the first year of the twenty-first century, there
is a new threat. Now science has apparently cracked the DNA code to such an
extent that the manipulation of human genes will soon be a possibility. This
could be a great opportunity as well as a threat, depending on what we make
of it. Given the politics currently raging behind the scenes of the Genome Project,
I take it to be more of a danger than anything else. Most of all, I am afraid
that some multinational corporation may decide to redesign human beings to automatically
crave what they have to sell.
II. Early Christian Background
A. Early Christian Humanism
The struggle for the human reaches far back into Christian history, indeed,
to the very beginning. When the Romans began to persecute the Christians, about
the time of the Emperor Nero, one of the reasons given in justification for
this by the historian Tacitus was that the Christians "hated the human
race."1 This is about the worst thing you could say about
anybody, but it
represents more of an emotional than an objective judgment. It does show that
the earliest Christians were quite different than the general population in
their approach to life. Apparently their lifestyle was so visibly different
that it threatened many people, including the great writer Tacitus.
Although it is clear that the Christians did not merit Tacitus' horrid remark,
it is not too hard to imagine why they were denounced. For one thing, they claimed
to be eating the very body and blood of Jesus Christ in their Eucharist. Isn't
that cannibalism?2 And secondly, they resolutely refused to worship
the gods
of the Roman state religion. Consequently, they were accused of atheism. It
seems that the people most threatened by the Christians were the conservative
and the pious Romans, not the profligate or the impious. They were threatening
what seemed to be the solidest human values of that society. That may be why
some of the best emperors were the worst persecutors.3
One might also contend that the defense of humanity against
dehumanization has always been a struggle. Yes, but recent times have seen the
Nazi holocaust, the Soviet gulags and the Cambodian killing fields ....
But there is another side to this matter as well. No matter how upright and
righteous the Roman pagans were, they countenanced certain practices that we
would now consider barbaric. For example, they regularly practiced the exposure
of infants; it was no crime to abandon unwanted babies, usually females, in
the town dump. Abortion was a given, although it was more dangerous than exposure.
Another typical Roman practice was the treatment of plague victims, who were
usually thrown out into the street to die. Since they had absolutely no knowledge
of the causes or the cure of plague, we can sympathize with them, but we still
shake our heads at their hardness of heart.
How did this all change? It seems that the Christians, those "haters of
the human race," those atheists, refused to accept these practices. They
believed that their discipleship in the gospel of Jesus Christ forbade them
to expose infants and abandon the sick. And so they rescued infants and tried
to comfort the dying. Not surprisingly, this kind of behavior attracted notice.
People first thought it was borderline insanity, but eventually it had its effect.
Pagans began to question their own humanism. They recognized that Christianity
indeed had a higher standard of morality, a better way to be human. According
to Rodney Stark in his wonderful book, The Rise of Christianity,
this was one of the chief reasons why Christianity eventually prevailed in the
late Roman Empire.4
B. Early Monastic Humanism
But there is another reason why early Christianity prevailed in the Roman Empire:
it became the state religion. Christianity evolved from being the object of
bloody persecution to toleration in the Edict of Constantine in AD 315. By the
end of the century, the Emperor Theodosius had declared Christianity the official
religion of the Roman Empire. Now it was disadvantageous, and even dangerous,
to remain a pagan. Anyone interested in doing well in the new society had to
become a Christian.
Not all Christians were happy with this development.5 Many of the old guard
felt that mass Christianity of this type was a sure way to guarantee hypocrisy
and a watering down of the gospel. A lot of the asceticism of the early Church
can be explained as a reaction against the new, "convenient Christianity."
And certainly the most spectacular form of asceticism was monasticism. We might
define it as a "turning away from the world," which often involved
a physical withdrawal to remote locations away from ordinary society.6 Before
the fourth century, there were professional "religious" in the Church.
But they lived scattered in the cities and in the parishes, not in segregated
and remote for ms. In addition, these new monachoi usually gathered
in some kind of groups to reinforce their intense form of Christianity.
A more cautious approach might be to ask how this movement could possibly
have flourished and gained such enormous popularity if it really was so
inhumane?
Perhaps not all of the earliest monks and nuns were consciously rejecting ordinary
life in the Church, but there is no doubt that their practices and attitudes
were distinctly counter-cultural. Most notably, they did not marry and raise
up families. That was the hallmark of the "religious" from the beginning
of the Church, but the new monks and nuns added a couple of other features that
made their lifestyle even more radical: they put aside all personal property
and they lived in obedience to a religious superior, usually called an abba
or an amma. To put it another way, they vowed and lived poverty, chastity
and obedience, and that lifestyle has become characteristic of all religious
to this day.
This kind of counter-cultural radicalism was not appreciated by everyone in
the fourth century, and the same goes for today. The pagans thought the monks
were even crazier than the rest of the Christians, but many pious Christians
were also horrified by the spectacle of their fellow-religionists abandoning
society and trekking off to the monastery or convent. What sense does it make
for a man or woman to voluntarily put aside some of the most cherished human
values: the right to a spouse and children; the right to own property; the right
to make the choices to determine one's own future? Many people felt that this
was an inhuman lifestyle, one that flew in the face of everything ordinary people
loved and valued.
One of the most acerbic critics of the early monks was the British historian
Edward Gibbon. In his classic book The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,
he blames Christianity for ruining that great civilization. And he saves some
of his bitterest vitriol for the monks:
These unhappy exiles from social life were impelled by the dark and
Implacable genius of superstition. . . . Reason might subdue, or passion
might suspend, its influence, but (it) acted most forcibly on the infirm minds
of children and females; they were strengthened by secret remorse or accidental
misfortune; and they might derive some aid from the temporal considerations
of vanity or interest.7
Yet Gibbon might be forgiven his spleen against the monks, since the literature
of the early monasticism itself often gives the impression of such extraordinary
asceticism as would seem quite inhuman to a neutral observer, even one as sophisticated
as Gibbon. The lives of the earliest monks sometimes paint a picture of people
intent on ruining their own bodies with penances, and the primitive monastic
legislation often seems to set a standard of renunciation quite beyond what
any ordinary human being could accomplish.8 Even a person less prejudiced than
Gibbon could be excused for suspecting that monasticism was designed by perverts
for the enjoyment of masochists.
A more cautious approach might be to ask how this movement could possibly have
flourished and gained such enormous popularity if it really was so inhumane?
If one were to start from the presumption that the early monks and nuns were
seeking a more humane lifestyle than what they found in contemporary society,
we might read those texts differently. With an eye for the humane, we might
notice, for example, how often the stories present monks or nuns engaged in
thoughtful conversations about how to live a wise and balanced life.
When a
seeker said: "Abba, give me a word of life," the answer was often
surprisingly humane and fresh with wisdom and insight. It is also notable how
often the earliest monks extended mercy to each other and refused to judge each
other harshly. Indeed, the literature of the Egyptian desert is today considered
some of the most humanly attractive stuff to come down to us from ancient times.9
III. The Humanism of Benedict
When we come to study Saint Benedict's humanism, there are many ways to approach
the question. Since he only uses the word "human" three times in his
entire Rule, that does not offer much linguistic data to build on. But I propose
to use those three instances as a kind of framework upon which to hang my thoughts
on the subject.
A. RB 37.1: Old people and Children
The first mention of humanity in the Rule occurs in a tiny chapter concerning
old people and children. It may surprise us to learn that there were always
children in early medieval monasteries. We can understand that monks might reach
old age, but what were children doing in such a place, apart from their parents
and family life? The simplest answer is that there were no other schools for
them at the time, and also that some of them were dedicated to God by their
parents as infants. But that leads to more questions that I do not intend to
answer. At any rate, Benedict wants these children treated tenderly: "While
human nature itself is indulgent toward these two groups, namely the aged and
children, the authority of the Rule should also look out for them." He
then goes on to say that they should be allowed to eat before the regular time.
The rest of the monks usually did not eat before mid-afternoon, so this was
an important concession.
In more practical terms, Benedict does not assume that the monks in his
monasteries are all nice people who would not dream of doing nasty things.
Rather than deal with the particulars of this minor rule, we might take a more
general look at Benedict's remark about "human nature."10 The thing
that is most striking about it is its optimism about the human condition. Benedict
seems confident that people will generally be kind and good, especially toward
the weakest members of society such as infants and the aged. We have already
seen, however, that before the advent of Christianity, ancient Roman society
was anything but "indulgent" towards infants. If they were defective
or the wrong sex, they were unceremoniously abandoned.11 And we have probably
heard that many primitive tribes banished old people from the group when they
were felt to be overly burdensome.
Nevertheless, Benedict does not hesitate to claim that human nature in itself
has merciful impulses. This could be looked on as an offhand remark, but in
view of the rest of his Rule, I take it to be his basic view of humanity. I
think it is accurate to say that when it comes to people, Benedict is optimistic.
Which reminds me of a line from an extraordinary movie entitled Harold
and Maude that tells of a romance between an 18-year-old boy and an
82-year-old woman. The latter is the star of the show, a really nice person.
At one point, Harold says in amazement: "You really like people, don't
you?" "Why not, says Maude, after all, they are my species!"
It seems to me that this is also true of Benedict: he likes people. Since one
of the definitions of humanism given by Webster is "devotion to human welfare
or strong interest and concern for human beings," this qualifies Benedict
as a humanist. I do not propose to run through the Holy Rule pulling up examples
of Benedict's sensitivity and care for people. I would prefer to discuss the
question from the standpoint of literary criticism.
One of the most startling and revolutionary discoveries of modern research
on the Rule of Benedict is simply this: the author is a copy-cat. It used to
be thought that Benedict was one of the most original and creative minds of
the middle ages, or at least that he had organized a vast amount of previous,
untidy monastic legislation into a neat package. Now we know different. In fact,
he reworked an older document, called the Rule of the Master, and
in places he copied it for verse after verse.12 If you are a traditional-minded
Benedictine, the idea that Benedict copied the Master is hard enough to swallow.
What is even worse is the suspicion that the Master is not a healthy personality.
This comes through in many ways in his Rule. For example, in dealing with guests,
the Master assumes they will be thieves and lazy bums. So he says they should
be put to work after three days. Furthermore, there should be two monks in charge
of them so that when one must sleep, the other should watch the guests. They
need to be watched, even when they rise to go to the bathroom at night. You
never know whast they might do.13 Another place where the Master displays his paranoia
is in regard to the sick, and he is not too subtle about it, either:
Brothers who say they are ill and do not rise for the Work of God and stay
lying down, should not be called to task, but for their meal let them receive
only liquids and eggs or warm water, which the sick can really hardly get
down, so that if they are pretending, hunger at least will force them to get
up (RM 69.1-3).
But even if they are willing to drag their sick bodies to prayer, they should
still not be trusted:
If a brother is very tired, with aching limbs but no fever, does not want
to incur the punishment of excommunication mentioned above, let him at least
go into the chapel with the brothers at the usual time. And if he cannot stand,
let him chant the psalms lying on a mat as if at prayer. But let the brother
standing next to him keep an eye on him so he does not go to sleep (RM 69.
9-11). 14
It would be easy to go on quoting this kind of strange stuff from the Master.15 The point I want to make here is that Benedict has carefully avoided almost
all of it. For example, his chapters on the guests and the sick betray little
or no suspicion of those people. And in general he manages to transcend the
Master's suspicion of human nature. Probably that is why the Rule of Benedict
has become a standard for Western monks for a thousand years, while the Rule
of the Master has been studiously ignored.
Someone glancing through Benedict's Rule for the first time, however, might
well suspect that I am exaggerating his optimism about human nature. For example,
the very first lines of the Prologue do not flatter the candidate but tell him
bluntly that he is a sinner who has turned away from God; his only chance is
to return to God by way of obedience. So Benedict completely shares the view
of the Bible that the only possibility of human salvation lies in repentance
and submission to the will of God.
In more practical terms, Benedict does not assume that the monks in his monasteries
are all nice people who would not dream of doing nasty things. In fact, he expects
that some of them will do awful things, and so they will have to be punished.
Moreover, he thinks that all of the monks need to be kept under a certain amount
of discipline for their own good. So he is not naïve about human potential.
He believes that everyone, including the abbot, is a sinner and that the way
of salvation is long and narrow. But that still does not make him a radical
pessimist.
In this section I have presented Saint Benedict as a relatively optimistic
personality who is inclined to trust people. It seems to me that a school that
claims to carry on the values of Benedict must retain something of this attitude.
There is plenty of pessimism at work in our society today; if there were not,
we in the United States would not be the only major western nation to employ
the death penalty, nor would we lead the western world in percentage of citizens
in prison. I realize that these are hard questions, and no easy answers are
available. Even within Christianity, some traditions are more or less optimistic
than others. But at the end of the day, we should remember that Benedict never
fed his monks raw eggs to drive them out of bed and back to work!
(Continue)
--
1 First, then, the confessed members of the sect were arrested; next, on their disclosures, vast numbers were convicted, not so much "on the count of arson as for hatred of the human race (odio humani generis)."
Annals, xv.44.
Loeb Classical Library, transl. John Jackson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1937) 285. Tacitus is referring to the charge of arson brought against Roman Christians by Nero. He does not believe they were guilty of that, but he certainly does not hold them in high esteem.
2 "The charges bandied about in the next century were those always favored in such cases: ritual murder, nameless abomination with extinguished lights, et hoc genus omne (Justin Martyr, Apol. 1.26, etc.)." Translator's note in Tacitus, (note I above) p. 282.
3 At least this seems to be true of
Hadrian and
Marcus Aurelius in the second century.
4 Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1996.
Stark is a sociologist, with a keen interest in the history of early Christianity. The most relevant chapters are 2: The Mission to the Jews: Why it probably succeeded; 3: Epidemics, Networks and Conversion; 4. The Role of Women in Christian Growth.
5 This is true, even today when many church historians consider that the embrace of Christianity by Constantine and his successors was very harmful to the Christian Church. A good example would be
Godfrey Diekmann, who declares flatly that the
Peace of Constantine was "the worst thing that ever happened to the Church!" Private conversation, June 10, 2000.
6 For a balanced and relatively up-to-date account of the beginnings of monasticism, see Mark Sheridan's essay "Anachoresis and the
Eremitical Movement" in RB 1980 (Collegeville, MN:
Liturgical, 1981) 17 ff.
7
The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (original, 1776-1788; quoted version Modern Library, 11.6).
8 Two reliable modern English translations of this material are found in
The Lives of the Desert Fathers (Cistercian, 1981) and
The Sayings of the Desert Fathers (Cistercian, 1975).
9 Graham Gould,
The Desert Fathers on Monastic Community (Oxford, Clarendon: 1993).
10 For a detailed commentary on this chapter [RB37], see
Aquinata Böckmann, "Of Old People and Children," The American Benedictine Review (1998:4) 343-355.
11 Of course not everyone in ancient pagan society was heartless. Some people rescued infants and adopted orphans. For a full study of this matter, see John Boswell,
The Kindness of Strangers (New York: Pantheon, 1988).
12 Although he did not himself discover this relationship, the scholar who has done the most to prove it and to explore its ramifications is
Adalbert de Vogüé in his monumental commentary La Règle de Saint Benoît (Paris: Cerf, 1972) six volumes.
13 RM 79.5,10,16.
14 Translation of Luke Eberle in
The Rule of the Master (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian, 1977).
15 The Master's pessimism is not limited to behavior that he distrusts. He actually believes that most people operate with a fundamentally crippled will that virtually guarantees they will reject the commandments of God. See my forthcoming study, "Will and Self-Will in the Rule of Benedict," in
Studia Monastica (Abbey of Montserrat, Spain).
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